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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples—maliciously crafted examples that can trigger the
target model to misbehave by adding imperceptible perturbations.
Existing attack methods for k-nearest neighbor (kNN) based algo-
rithms either require large perturbations or are not applicable for
large k. To handle this problem, this paper proposes a new method
called AdvKNN for evaluating the adversarial robustness of kNN-
based models. Firstly, we propose a deep kNN block to approximate
the output of kNN methods, which is differentiable thus can pro-
vide gradients for attacks to cross the decision boundary with small
distortions. Second, a new consistency learning for distribution in-
stead of classification is proposed for the effectiveness in distribution
based methods. Extensive experimental results indicate that the pro-
posed method significantly outperforms state of the art in terms of
attack success rate and the added perturbations.
Index Terms— Adversarial examples, attack, kNN, gradient,
distribution
1. INTRODUCTION
The security of deep learning models has gained tremendous atten-
tion, considering that they are the backbone techniques behind var-
ious applications, such as image recognition, translation, etc [1, 2,
3, 4]. Nonetheless, prior works mainly focus on higher accuracy,
ignoring their robustness though adversaries can significantly affect
the performance with small perturbations [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11], lim-
iting the domains in which neural networks can be used, such as
safepay with face recognition [12] and self-driving [13].
To handle this problem, effective and generic defenses for deep
models are proposed, such as adversarial training, data augmenta-
tion, distillation and etc [14, 15, 16, 17]. K-nearest neighbor (kNN)
based methods [13, 18, 19] are one of the toughest kind of defenses
since they’re non-parametric and can hinder gradients for the guid-
ance of adversaries generation. For example, based on kNN, Deep
k-nearest neighbors algorithm (DkNN) [13] defenses the adversarial
examples by ensembling kNN classifiers based on features extracted
from each layer, which can effectively defense adversaries generated
by FGSM [20], BIM [21], CW [22] attacks.
This work studies the problem of attacking kNN classifiers and
evaluating their robustness. Previous attempts on attacking kNN
models either apply gradient-based attacks to some continuous sub-
stitute models of NN [23] or use some heuristics [24]. For example,
Papernot et al. [23] proposed to employ a differentiable substitue
for attacking 1-NN model, which is not applicable for kNN model
with large k; Sitawarin et al. [24] proposed some heuristic methods
to find adversarial targets and then use gradient-based model to find
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Fig. 1: Illustration of minimum adversarial perturbation. From left
to right, the yellow circles are the corresponding adversaries gener-
ated with minimum perturbations (black lines with arrow) for DNN,
kNN (k = 1) and the method in [24] respectively.
the optimal solutions to keep perturbations smallest. However, the
distortions are still not small enough to be imperceptible.
In this paper, we propose a new adversarial attack called Ad-
vKNN to attack kNN and DkNN classifiers with small distortions.
Firstly, we design a deep kNN block (DkNNB) to approximate the
output of kNN classifiers, which is differentiable so that it can guide
the generation of adversarial examples with small distortion. To
make the method more robust for DkNN, which summaries k nearest
neighbors of each layer to get the final decision instead of the max-
imum probability like classical classifier does, we propose a new
consistency learning (CL) for probability distribution of k nearest
neighbors instead of labels only. Combined DkNNB and CL with
simple attacks such as FGSM [20], BIM [21], we find that both kNN
and DkNN are vulnerable to adversarial examples with a small per-
turbation. Under L∞ norm [13], our method manages to reduce the
accuracy of DkNN on MNIST [25] to only 5.71% with mean L2
distortion 1.4909, while Sitawarin et al. [24] got 17.44% with dis-
tortion 3.476.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose a deep kNN block to approximate the output
probability distribution of k nearest neighbors, which is differen-
tiable and thus can provide gradients to attack NN and DkNN models
with small distortions.
2) We propose a new consistency learning for distribution in-
stead of classification, which makes our method more effective and
robust for distribution based defenses.
3) We evaluate our method on kNN and DkNN models, showing
that the proposed AdvKNN outperforms prior attacks with higher
attack success rate and smaller mean L2 distortion. Besides, we
show that the credibility scores from DkNN models are not effective
for detecting our attacks.
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this paper, we focus on the adversarial examples in classification
task based on deep neural networks (DNN). Adversarial example
is a type of evasion attack against DNN at test time, that aims to
find small perturbations to fool DNN models, which is defined as
follows:
argmin
δ
D(x, x+ δ), s.t. F (x+ δ) 6= y, x+ δ ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where D is the distance metrics, F is the DNN model, y is the true
label of x, and δ is the perturbation. Adversaries are generated by at-
tack methods while defenses algorithms are designed to resist them.
2.1. Classical Attacks
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM [20] is one of the
most classical attack method. It’s designed primarily for efficiency
and optimized with L∞ distance metric, which controls the maxi-
mum absolute value of perturbation for one single pixel. Given an
image x, FGSM sets
x′ = x+  · sign(5lossF,y(x)), (2)
where  is chosen to be sufficiently small so as to be imperceptible.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM [21] is a refinement of FGSM.
It takes multiple smaller steps α in the direction of the gradient sign
and during each step the result is clipped by the same  instead of
taking one single step of size . Specifically, x′0 = x, while
xi = x
′
i−1 + clip(α · sign(5lossF,y(x′i−1))), i 6= 0, (3)
where x′i is the generated adversarial example of input x after step i.
2.2. KNN-based Defenses
Fig. 1 illustrates the smallest perturbation needed to attack DNN and
kNN based classifiers. As shown in Fig. 1, only a small perturba-
tion is needed to cross the decision boundary when attacking normal
DNN classifiers. To make models more robust, kNN-based meth-
ods are proposed. The kNN classifier is a popular non-parametric
classifier that predicts the label of an input by finding its k nearest
neighbors in some distance metric such as Euclidean or cosine dis-
tance and taking a majority vote from the labels of neighbors [26].
The perturbation needed for kNN classifier is much larger than nor-
mal DNN classifiers, which makes attacks more difficult.
DkNN is a more robust kNN-based algorithm, which integrates
predicted k nearest neighbors of all layers. Denote pli(x) as proba-
bility predicted by kNN of class i in layer l of input x, then the final
prediction of DkNN is
DkNN(x) = argmax
i
∑L
l=1 p
l
i(x), s.t. i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , C], (4)
where C and L are number of classes and layers respectively. In
addition to the final prediction, it proposes a metric called credibil-
ity to measure the consistency of k nearest neighbors in each layer.
The higher the adversary’s credibility is, the model will treat it as
clean sample with higher confidence. The credibility is computed
by counting the number of k nearest neighbors of each layer from
classes other than the majority, and this score is compared to the
scores when classifying samples from a held-out calibration set.
cred(x) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
J(
L∑
l=1
pli(x) >
L∑
l=1
plt(xn)), s.t. i = DkNN(x),
(5)
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Fig. 2: Illustraion of the proposed AdvKNN. The distribution of k
nearest neighbors of inputs are used as the guidelines for optimizing
DkNNB with CL.
where n ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N ]. xn and t are the n-th sample and corre-
sponding true label in calibration set which has N samples and
J(y) =
{
1, y is True
0, y is False
. (6)
To evaluate the robustness of such kNN-based methods, Sitawarin
et al. [24] mentioned that the minimum adversarial perturbation has
to be on the straight line connecting x and the center of training
instances belonging to a different class, and once the target center
is focused, they use gradient based method to find the smallest per-
turbation. However, as shown in Fig. 1, the optimal perturbation
may not be on the lines connecting two points, but on the point who
crosses the kNN decision boundary. Besides, the method proposed
by Sitawarin et al. [24] that finds adversaries in input space instead
of feature space is not computationally efficient.
3. ADVKNN: ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON KNN
This paper focuses on attacking kNN and DkNN classifiers. Our
objective function can be denoted as:
argmin
δ
D(x, x+ δ), s.t. kNN(x+ δ) 6= kNN(x),
DkNN(x+ δ) 6= DkNN(x). (7)
We detail our method with the specific introduction of DkNNB
and consistency learning for distribution.
Notation. Denote a predicted distribution of an input x as
f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fC(x)], s.t.
∑C
i=1 fi(x) = 1, (8)
t = argmax
i
fi(x), i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , C], (9)
where fi(x) is the probability of x belonging to class i and t is the
predicted label of x.
DkNNB. Let us start by precisely defining kNN. Assume that we are
given a query item x, a database G of candidate items (gi)i∈I with
indices I = 1, . . . ,M for matching, and a distance metric D(·, ·)
between pairs of items. Suppose that x is not in the database, D
yields a ranking of the database items according to the distance to
the query. Let pi : I → I be a permutation that sorts the database
items by increasing distance to x:
pix(i) < pix(i
′)⇒ D(x, gi) ≤ D(x, gi′), ∀i, i′ ∈ I. (10)
The kNN of x are the given by the set of the first k items:
kNN(x,G) = {gi | pix(i) ≤ k}. (11)
The kNN selection is deterministic but not differentiable. This ef-
fectively hinders to derive gradient to guide the generation of ad-
versaries with small perturbation for methods such as FGSM, BIM
and etc. We aim to approximate the prediction of kNN with neural
networks, which can offer gradients for optimizing.
We focus on white-box threat model [8] for attacks on both kNN
and DkNN, which means the attackers have access to the training set
and all the parameters of target models. Since the training set as
well as k are a kind of parameters of kNN classifiers as they are
used during inference, we assume they are known by attackers as
Sitawarin et al. [24].
To find the decision boundary of kNN classifiers, we propose
a deep kNN block (DkNNB). Specifically, the DkNNB is a small
neural network which aims to approximate the output of k nearest
neighbors of an input x. The illustration is presented in Fig. 2.
Suppose the distribution predicted by kNN and estimated distri-
bution inferenced by DkNNB are p(x) and q(x) respectively. For a
general kNN classification model, its prediction is a label t, and the
corresponding distribution po(x) is a one hot vector:
poi (x) =
{
1, i = t
0, others
. (12)
Then the loss for optimizing DkNNB towards kNN classifier is
LCLS = −
∑
∀x
po(x) log q(x) = −
∑
∀x
log qt(x). (13)
Then the derivative with respect to x is:
∂
∂x
LCLS = − ∂
∂x
log qt(x). (14)
Consistency learning for distribution. As detailed in Section 2.2,
DkNN summarizes probability distribution of outputs. However, as
shown in Eq. (14), learning with the classification loss only penalizes
the true class, which is not optimal to approximate kNN classifica-
tion. Besides, the targets of kNN and DNN are correct classification
labels. Learning the output labels of kNN will force the DkNNB to
get the same parameters with the DNN classifier. To overcome these
problems and further improve the attack performance, we propose to
learn from the output distribution rather than classification. We pro-
pose a new consistency learning (CL) for distribution. Specifically,
we define a new CL loss to guide the optimizing of DkNNB:
LCL =
∑
∀x
p(x)(log p(x)− log q(x)). (15)
Denote λ as a hyperparameter, the final loss is:
L = λLCLS + LCL. (16)
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Datasets and Experimental Setting
Baselines & Datasets. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed AdvKNN, we evaluate our method on three datasets:
MNIST [25], SVHN [27], and FashionMnist [28]. For each dataset,
750 samples (75 from each class) from the testing split are held out
as the calibration set. We reimplement DkNN from Papernot [13]
with the same parameters as Sitawarin et al. did [24] , including
the base classifier network architecture and the value of k = 75.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of k nearest neighbors of clean samples and ad-
versarial examples. The left and right columns show the final deci-
sions of kNN and DkNN as well as the neighbors in each layer of the
clean sample and the corresponding adversarial example generated
by the proposed AdvKNN.
Table 1: Classification Accuracy(%) of DNN, kNN, DkNN and
DkNNB.
DNN kNN DkNN DkNNB
MNIST 99.17 98.98 98.89 98.75
SVHN 89.93 88.37 90.35 88.32
FashionMnist 91.22 89.87 90.28 89.23
The proposed method can be applied to any gradient based attack
algorithms. We choose FGSM, BIM as the baseline attacks which
are optimized under L∞ norm [22]. They are also used in DkNN
for robustness evaluation [13]. Likewise, all the hyperparameters
are set the same to the DkNN paper [13].
The proposed DkNNB is implemented with a fully connected
layer. λ is set to 0.3 for all the three datasets. If not mentioned,
kNN is conducted on the last convolution layer. The classification
accuracies of the backbone network (DNN), kNN, DkNN as well as
DkNNB are shown in Table 1.
4.2. Results and Discussion
Fig. 3 shows a clean sample and its adversarial versions generated
by our method along with their five nearest neighbors at each layer.
One the left column, all the majorities of the 5 neighbors in each
layer belong to the same class as input. The final predictions of kNN
and DkNN are correct. However, as shown on the right column, the
majority of neighbors of the adversarial example are of the incorrect
class. Both kNN and DkNN are fooled successfully by adversaries
with imperceptible distortions.
Metrics. We employ kNN accuracy, DkNN accuracy, mean L2
distortion and mean credibility [13] to evaluate the effectiveness of
our method [24]. Lower kNN accuracy, DkNN accuracy, mean
L2 distortion and higher credibility mean better performance:
Attack success rate = 1− Accuracy.
Comparison with state-of-the-art methods. Table 2 is the result of
DkNNB added to the third layer. It shows the performances of attack
methods before and after combining with the proposed method. With
Table 2: Evaluation results of the proposed DkNNB and Consistency Learning
Classifiers Methods MNIST SVHN FashionMnistClean FGSM BIM Clean FGSM BIM Clean FGSM BIM
kNN(ACC(%)) ↓
Origin 98.98 44.48 2.14 88.37 23.59 15.26 89.87 23.23 5.82
DkNNB 98.98 15.79 1.42 88.37 19.05 12.87 89.87 17.85 9.66
DkNNB+CL 98.98 15.28 1.03 88.37 16.37 9.28 89.87 11.87 7.54
DkNN(ACC(%)) ↓
Origin 98.89 54.90 16.80 90.35 28.60 17.90 90.28 31.65 16.28
DkNNB 98.89 28.57 6.49 90.35 22.89 13.98 90.28 30.38 14.87
DkNNB+CL 98.89 28.08 5.97 90.35 19.94 10.23 90.28 24.65 12.88
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Fig. 4: Results of DkNNB and CL on different layers on MNIST.
Table 3: Transferability of the generated adversaries on LeNet5.
Accuracy(%) on LeNet5 ↓ DNN kNN DkNN
FGSM Origin 68.42 75.06 81.41DkNNB+CL 56.06 64.97 75.70
BIM Origin 47.46 59.72 72.61DkNNB+CL 47.55 56.37 70.04
DkNNB, both FGSM and BIM attacks can degrade the classification
accuracy of both kNN and DkNN by a large margin in most cases.
After combined with CL, the performance is better.
Fig. 4 shows the accuracies of kNN and DkNN changed with
different mean L2 distortions. The purple plus marker is the best
attack result on DkNN with L∞ norm released by [24]. It can be
seen that our method can get the same accuracy drop with much
lower L2 distortion. In Fig. 5, we show the distribution of credi-
bility for the clean samples and adversarial examples generated by
the proposed AdvKNN under different mean distortions. It can be
observed that filtering out adversaries needs a lot of accuracy sacri-
fice of clean samples. With credibility score threshold 0.5, 71.42%
adversarial examples generated with mean L2 distortion 0.3 can be
detected, but 47.54% clean samples will be filtered out too. Besides,
mean credibility of methods proposed by Sitawarin [24] is 0.1037
with mean L2 distortion 3.476, while ours is 0.4608 with distortion
3.005, which indicates that our attack is more difficult to be detected.
The generated adversarial examples are shown in Fig. 6.
For evaluating the transferability of generated adversaries to find
if the generated adversaries can attack other models successfully, we
further test the performance on LeNet5 [29] trained with clean sam-
ples of MNIST. Table 3 shows the comparison of classification ac-
curacy from different attack methods. It can be seen that adversaries
generated with the proposed method performs better than FGSM and
BIM, indicating the boost of adversarial examples transferability.
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Fig. 6: Generated adversaries
under different L∞ norm
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Fig. 7: Comparison of performances with different k.
Ablation study. As shown in Fig. 4, the proposed DkNNB is al-
ways effective when equipped to each layer. Layer 3 performs the
best in terms of kNN accuracy. This is reasonable because kNN is
conducted on layer 3. It can be observed that the adversaries gener-
ated with DkNNB equipped to layer 2 also perform well, indicating
the transferability between layers. Besides, we evaluate the attack
performance under different k. As shown in Fig. 7, the proposed
method always performs the best comparing with FGSM and BIM
in terms of kNN and DkNN attack success rates.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we put forward a new method for attacking kNN and
DkNN models to evaluate their robustness against adversarial ex-
amples, which can be easily combined with existing gradient based
attacks. Specifically, we proposed a differentiable deep kNN block
to approximate the distribution of k nearest neighbors, which can
provide estimated gradients as the guidance of adversaries. Besides,
we also proposed a new consistency learning for attack robustness
on distribution based defense models. We conducted extensive ex-
periments and demonstrated the effectiveness of each part of the pro-
posed algorithm, as well as the superior overall performance.
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